The authors present an automatic method for the synthesis of certificates for components in embedded real-time systems. A certificate is a small homomorphic abstraction that can transparently replace the component during model checking: if the verification with the certificate succeeds, then the component is guaranteed to be correct; if the verification with the certificate fails, then the component itself must be erroneous. The authors give a direct construction, based on a forward and backward reachability analysis of the timed system, and an iterative refinement process, which produces a series of successively smaller certificates. In their experiments, model checking the certificate is several orders of magnitude faster than model checking the original system.
Introduction
Model checking allows the developer of an embedded real-time system to detect inconsistent timing requirements and functional errors early in the design process. If the system contains an error, tools like Uppaal [20] provide evidence in the form of an error trace, which can be used to reproduce the problem during simulation. If the system is correct, however, most model checkers only report the fact, without providing evidence that would help the designer understand why the system is correct, or help an independent verifier reproduce the proof.
In this paper, we present an automatic certificate synthesis method, which provides such evidence. For a given component in a network of timed automata, we compute a quotient automaton, which we call the component's certificate. The certificate satisfies three key properties. First, it is sound to replace the component with its certificate during the verification of the network. We guarantee both that if the verification with the certificate succeeds, then the component itself is correct, and that if the verification with the certificate fails, then the component itself is erroneous. Second, it is easy to verify the validity of the certificate: The certificate is a simple homomorphic abstraction of the component, which means that each location of the certificate represents a set of locations in the component. Hence, verifying that the component is an accurate implementation of the certificate amounts to a simple (syntactic) simulation check. Third, the certificate is much smaller than the component. Since certificates only need to preserve those component properties that are actually necessary to establish the correctness of the full network, they can be based on a coarse equivalence relation, resulting in small certificates. Hence, validating the certificate, i.e., proving that the system with the component replaced by the certificate is correct, is much easier than verifying the original system. This has the advantage that the validation can be carried out faster, on simpler hardware, or with less optimized (and therefore possibly more trustworthy) verification tools. In the following, we present three practical usage scenarios for certificates. In the certified modules scenario, depicted in Figure 1 , the customer of a software vendor demands proof that a delivered program module will work correctly in the customer's software environment. For this purpose, the customer provides the vendor with a specification N of the software environment and a specification P of the desired correctness properties. The vendor develops the new module M and proves the correctness of M N using a certifying model checker, obtaining the certificate C. The vendor delivers both M and C to the customer, who can now check that M is correct without repeating the full verification of M N , by validating (1) that C is indeed a certificate of M, i.e., M |= C, and (2) that C guarantees P in the context of N , i.e., C N |= P.
In the certified updates scenario, shown in Figure 2 , the interaction between customer and vendor continues when the vendor produces new versions of the software module. Now the vendor uses the certificate to determine which modifications in M can be made without compromising the original correctness properties P. Both the vendor and the customer can convince themselves that the updates do no harm simply by checking that C is still a certificate for the current version of M.
The third usage scenario, the certified product lines scenario shown in Figure 3 , concerns a more complex interaction where the vendor uses multiple third-party suppliers to obtain several different versions of M. For this purpose, the vendor first develops a reference implementation M r and verifies M r using a certifying model checker. Each supplier can then use the certificate as a guideline to implement a customized version M s of M. As long as the simple check M s |= C succeeds, the customized version is guaranteed to work correctly when integrated into the full system.
We illustrate the construction of certificates with a small example. Figure 4 shows a network of timed automata modeling a simple production plant with two controllers. The plant processes workpieces at a rate of up to 0.5 pieces per second. When a workpiece enters the plant, both controllers are notified with the start signal. Then, the machine controlled by the first controller works on the piece (work 1 ) and finishes within two seconds. Once the first machine is done (finish 1 ), the machine controlled by the second controller works on the piece (work 2 ) and finishes (finish 2 ) again within at most two seconds. Afterwards, the controllers may be reset (reset) to be ready for the next workpiece. The actions abort 1 and abort 2 model a situation where the respective machine has not started working after one second, in which case the controllers can abort. We are interested in the property that the work on each workpiece is done (if completed) in at most four seconds. Figure 5 shows the certificate for controller #2. Locations e, f, i and locations g, h have been merged into single locations. This results in an overapproximation of the observable behavior of controller #2: for example, the controller now accepts an arbitrary number of start signals. However, the certificate is sound for proving that the work on each piece is done within four seconds, because the relevant requirement for controller #2, that its work is finished within two seconds after receiving the finish 1 signal, is preserved.
Our construction of the certificate is based on two equivalence relations over the locations of a given automaton within a network of timed automata. As explained in Section 4, we compare two locations m 1 and m 2 by analyzing the set of states that are forward-reachable from the initial states and backward-reachable from the error.
If, for every forward-reachable state s 1 , where the automaton is at m 1 , there is a corresponding state s 2 at m 2 , such that s 1 and s 2 are identical except for the locations of the automaton, and, vice versa, for every forward-reachable state where the automaton is at m 2 there is a corresponding forward-reachable state at m 1 , then m 1 and m 2 are forward-equivalent. Analogously, the analysis of the backward-reachable states defines the backward-equivalent locations.
In the example, locations g and h of controller #2 are forward-equivalent because they are both forward-reachable in conjunction with locations d and k and clock values x − 2 ≤ y ≤ x ∧ z = x. Locations e, f, and i are backward-equivalent: the error location π is unreachable from all these locations.
The forward and backward equivalences can be computed directly, by computing the sets of forward and backward reachable states in the network. In Section 6, we additionally demonstrate that it is possible to construct the equivalence from abstractions of the original system. Then, in Section 7, we show how these abstractions can be computed using the refinement loop depicted in Figure 6 . Starting with a coarse initial abstraction, the loop produces a sequence of increasingly precise abstractions of the system M N . Each abstraction yields an approximation of the forward and backward reachable states, and, hence, an approximation of the equivalence relation ≈ on the locations of M. Since any approximation of the reachable states results in a sound certificate, the refinement process can be interrupted at any time, for example, when a preset time limit has expired, when the certificate has become sufficiently small, or if no further improvement is possible.
In each iteration of the loop, the abstraction of M N is refined in order to obtain a more precise approximation of the reachable states. We discuss appropriate refinement strategies in Section 8.
In Section 9, we present experimental results that indicate that model checking the certificate is significantly faster (in our experiments, by several orders of magnitude) than model checking the original system. Related Work. The term certifying model checkers was coined by Namjoshi [22] in the setting of µ-calculus model checking for labeled finite-state transition systems. Different from our component-based setting, a certificate in [22] is a deductive proof of a global property, which is checked by inductive, rather than fixpoint-based methods. Certificate synthesis reduces the size of a timed automaton by merging locations. This approach can be compared to reduction techniques that merge states. Typically, some initial partition of the state space is split until the coarsest stable refinement is reached [2, 23, 11] , or states are collapsed based on some equivalence such as history equivalence or transition bisimulation [17] . An early proposal for an equivalence that is parameterized with information about the context of a process is context dependent process equivalence [21] .
State minimization techniques are useful to obtain a compact finite representation of the infinite state space of a timed automaton. As systems with dense time have an uncountable state space, all model checking algorithms build on abstraction (and hence on state minimization). The most widespread approach is to use approximate [5] or precise [20, 9] abstractions of the finite region graph [3] of timed automata. A common problem with these abstraction methods is, however, that they are not compositional and therefore cannot be applied to individual automata in a network of timed automata. Other reduction techniques, which can potentially be combined with state minimization, include partial order reduction (based on a local-time semantics) [7] and clock elimination [10] .
Algorithms similar to certificate synthesis are studied in the setting of compositional model checking. To prove a property P for the parallel composition M N of two timed automata M and N , the compositional model checker CMC [18, 19] first transforms the property with respect to N into P/N , and then, after simplification, further into P/N /M. The transformed property P/N /M is checked against the unit automaton 1. In this process, P/N can be understood as a certificate for M, because, if M satisfies P/N , then M N must satisfy P. A certificate generated in this way is not guaranteed to be a homomorphic abstraction of M, however. In fact, the computation of P/N is completely independent of M.
A prominent approach to the compositional model checking of untimed systems is by learning certificates as deterministic word automata [8, 4, 1] . Here, a preliminary certificate C (initially, an automaton accepting the full language) is evaluated against both N and P by model checking. As long as either C rejects some computation of N or M C accepts a computation that violates P, C is refined to eliminate the particular counter-example. This approach has been successful for discrete systems (cf. the LTSA tool [8] ). Since no similar learning algorithms are known for timed languages, however, an immediate extension to real-time systems appears impossible.
As a preparatory step to the work presented in this paper, we investigated quotient-based certificates in the discrete setting of the SPIN model checker [16] . Given two Promela processes M, N and a property automaton P, our tool RESY [15, 12] performs a graph-theoretic analysis of the product of N and P to identify states in M that can safely be merged. For timed systems, a graph-theoretical analysis alone is, of course, not sound, because one location may be safe and another unsafe, even if both have a (discrete) path to an error location.
Contribution. In this paper, we present a general theory and algorithms for the synthesis of certificates in networks of timed automata. The contributions of the paper are the following.
• We define novel equivalence relations for timed automata, which are coarser than simulation but still sound for compositional model checking.
• Based on the new equivalence relations, we present an algorithm for the automatic synthesis of certificates.
• We present an incremental approach for the synthesis of certificates, which can be interrupted at any time to produce a sound intermediate certificate.
Preliminaries
Timed Automata. For a given set χ of real-valued clocks, the clock constraints ϕ ∈ C(χ) are of the form
where x is a clock in χ and c is a constant in
, where L is a finite set of locations, I ⊆ L is a set of the initial locations, Σ is a finite set of actions, χ is a finite set of real-valued
is a transition relation, and F ⊆ L is a set of final locations. A clock valuation t : χ → R ≥0 assigns a non-negative value to each clock and can also be represented by a |χ|-dimensional vector t ∈ R, where R = R χ ≥0 denotes the set of all clock valuations.
The semantics of a timed automaton is an (infinite) transition system, where each state is a pair (l, t) of a location and a clock valuation. There are two types of transitions: timed and discrete. A timed transition, denoted by (l, t) a − → (l, t + a · 1), consists of adding the same non-negative value a ∈ R ≥0 to all clocks, the location l remains unchanged. A discrete transition for some action a ∈ Σ, denoted by (l, t) a − → (l , t ), moves from a location l and a clock valuation t to a location l and a clock valuation t , such that for some transition l, a, ϕ, λ, l ∈ ∆ of the timed automaton, t satisfies the clock constraint ϕ, and t = t[λ := 0] is obtained from t by setting the clocks in λ to 0.
We distinguish system automata, which only have final locations, from property automata, where the set of final locations forms a proper subset of the locations. We assume that, in a property automaton, the sets of initial and final locations are disjoint.
We say that a finite sequence
is a state of the automaton, s 0 is an initial state (that is, l 0 ∈ I is an initial location and t 0 = 0 is the zero vector), and s i−1 a i − → s i are transitions of A. We write s 0 −→ * s k for the existence of a finite sequence a 1 . . . a k ∈ (Σ ∪ R ≥0 )
* of transitions with s 0
− → s k , and call a finite automaton safe if no final state is reachable from an initial state (
Composition. Timed automata can be composed to networks, in which the automata run in parallel and synchronize on shared actions. For two timed automata
, where ∆ is the smallest set that contains
, and
Parallel composition is associative and commutative and therefore generalizes to sets of automata. For the ease of argumentation, we assume that all timed automata within a network have the same set Σ of actions. Technically, we can complete a timed automaton by adding a transition l, a, true, ∅, l for every additional symbol a and every location l of the timed automaton without changing the network semantics.
Finite Representation. The decidability of timed automata relies on the possibility to symbolically represent the unbounded semantics in the finite region graph [3] , which in turn can be represented efficiently by federations of clock zones [6] .
For a timed automaton A = (L, I, Σ, ∆, χ, F ), we call the value of a clock x ∈ χ maximal if it is strictly greater than the highest constant c max any clock is compared to. (c max is sometimes called the clock ceiling.) We say that two clock valuations t 1 , t 2 : χ → R ≥0 are in the same clock region, denoted t 1 ∼ R t 2 , if
• the set of clocks with maximal value is the same in t 1 and in t 2 (∀x ∈ χ. t 1 (x) > c max ⇔ t 2 (x) > c max ), and
• t 1 and t 2 agree (1) on the integer parts of the clock values, (2) on the relative order of the non-integer parts of the clock values, and (3) on the equality of the non-integer parts of the clock values with 0. That is, for all clocks x, y with non-maximal value, it holds that (1)
, and (3) t 1 (x) = 0 if, and only if,
We denote with [ t] R = { t ∈ R | t ∼ R t } the clock region t belongs to. We say that two states s 1 = (l 1 , t 1 ) and s 2 = (l 2 , t 2 ) of A are region-equivalent, denoted by s 1 ∼ R s 2 , if their locations are the same (l 1 = l 2 ) and the clock valuations are in the same clock region ( t 1 ∼ R t 2 ), and denote with [(l, t)] R = {(l, t ) ∈ L × R | t ∼ R t } the equivalence class of region-equivalent states (l, t) belongs to.
Regions are a suitable semantics for the abstraction of timed automata, because they essentially preserve the language: if there is a discrete transition s a − → s from a state s to a state s of a timed automaton, then there is, for all states r ∼ R s region-equivalent to s, a state r ∼ R s regionequivalent to s , such that r a − → r is a discrete transition with the same label. For timed transitions, a slightly weaker property holds: If there is a timed transition s t − → s from a state s to a state s , then there is, for all states r ∼ R s region-equivalent to s, a state r ∼ R s region-equivalent to s such that there is a timed transition r t − → r (but possibly with a different t = t). The finite semantics of a timed automaton A = (L, I, Σ, χ, ∆, F ) is the finite graph sem(A) = (S, I , Σ, χ, ∆ , F ) where
is the set of equivalence classes of region-equivalent states of A, with
• the classes I = (I × { 0})/ ∼ R of states that are region-equivalent to initial states of A as initial states,
→ r } of transitions, and 
there is a finite path from a state (l, t) to a state (l , t ) if, and only if, there is a finite path from (l, t) R to (l , t ) R in sem(A).
Proof: For every finite path s 0
Conversely, we show by induction on the length of the path that, for every path in sem(A) from (l, t) R to (l , t ) R , A has a path from (l, t) to a state s ∼ R (l , t ) region equivalent to (l , t (1) If this concrete transition is discrete (a ∈ Σ) then it refers to some transition δ = l, a, ϕ, λ, l . δ can be taken from all representatives (l, t 1 ) ∼ R s 1 of [s 1 ] R because the validity of ϕ is independent of the representative. Taking δ from two representatives (l, t 1 ), (l, t 1 ) ∼ R s 1 of [s 1 ] R leads to states (l , t 2 ) and (l , t 2 ) with the same location and t 2 = t 1 [λ := 0] and
(2) If this concrete transition is timed (a ∈ R ≥0 ), it suffices to show that t 1 ∼ R t 1 and t 2 = t 1 + a · 1 implies the existence of an a ∈ R ≥0 such that t 2 = t 1 + a · 1. This is obviously true: If one of the non-maximal clocks, say x, has an integer value in t 2 , we have to choose a = t 2 (x) − t 1 (x). Otherwise we pick a non-maximal clock x with a minimal fractional part f and set a = t 2 (x) − f − t 1 (x) + ε for a sufficiently small ε. (Sufficiently small means smaller than all strictly positive fractional parts of clock values and of differences of clock values.)
The Certificate Synthesis Problem
We now give a formal definition for the problem of synthesizing certificates in networks of timed automata. Let M be a timed automaton in a network M N . We call the timed automaton N the environment of M. Typically, N is the parallel composition of several system automata and some property automaton that defines the safety-critical properties of the complete network.
A timed automaton C is a certificate for M in M N if C is a homomorphic abstraction of M such that M N is safe if and only if C N is safe. Homomorphic abstractions are defined as follows:
A timed automaton M is a homomorphic abstraction of a timed automaton M = (L, I, Σ, χ, ∆, F ), if there exists an equivalence relation ⊆ L × L on the locations of M such that M is the quotient of M with respect to . For a given equivalence relation , the quotient M/ is defined as the timed automaton (L , I , Σ, χ, ∆ , F ) with
l} denotes the equivalence class of a location l ∈ L with respect to ,
In general, a timed automaton M may have multiple certificates; in particular, M itself is always a certificate, where the equivalence is simply the identity relation on the locations. Computing the minimal certificate is possible in theory (for example, by enumerating all certificates) but too expensive in practice: Proof: Safety of M N can be checked in linear time in the number of locations [3] ; the problem is therefore in NP. We show NP-hardness with a reduction from graph k-colorability. An undirected graph G = (V, E) is k-colorable if there is a function f : V → {1, 2, . . . , k} such that f (u) = f (v) whenever there is an edge {u, v} ∈ E. Let V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. To decide k-colorability of G, we consider the following pair of timed automata M, N . The automaton M = (V, V, E, ∆ M , ∅, V ) has one location for each vertex in V . The actions consist of the edges in E. M is acyclic: for each action {v i , v j } we add a transition from location v i to location v j if i < j:
reaches the final location l F only on paths with exactly two discrete transitions, which must have the same action. We add a transition from the initial location on input e to location e, and from location e on input e to the final location s F : ∆ E = {(l I , e, true, ∅, e) | e ∈ E} ∪ {(e, e, true, ∅, l F ) | e ∈ E}. Figure 7 shows an example illustrating this construction.
On the one hand, every certificate C for M in M N , whose equivalence has k equivalence classes, defines a k-coloring f of G:
if there were a pair of vertices v i , v j with {v i , v j } ∈ E and v i v j , then C N would have an error path on {v i , v j }, {v i , v j }, whereas M N does not have any error paths. On the other hand, if G is k-colorable, then the quotient of M with respect to is a certificate, because C N , like M N , has no error paths: on every path in C N , each e ∈ E occurs at most once.
In the following sections we present equivalence relations that, while inexpensive to compute, define small certificates. 
Forward and Backward Equivalences
In this section, we define the forward equivalence F and the backward equivalence B over the locations of a timed automaton M in a network M N . Intuitively, two locations of M are forward-equivalent, if merging them does not make additional states reachable in sem(M N ), and backward-equivalent, if merging them does not make final states reachable from additional states in sem(M N ).
Let L M and L N be the locations of M and N , respectively, and let
Both equivalences define certificates. 
Then there exists the corresponding path ([m 0 ], n 0 , 0)
To prove the "only if " direction for forward equivalence, we first observe that the reachability of (m, n, For the induction step (
is an initial state of sem(M/ F N ). By induction hypothesis, for all representatives s
is a transition of sem(M N ). Together, this implies that (m , n k+1 , [ t k+1 ] R ) is reachable in sem(M N ), and, using the previous observation, we can conclude that all representatives of ([m ] F , n k+1 , [ t k+1 ] R ) are reachable in sem(M N ).
The "only if " direction for backward equivalence can be demonstrated analogously.
The computation of the set of reachable states is a standard fixed point construction. Let (S, I, Σ, ∆, X, F ) = sem(M N ) be the finite semantics of the composition of M and N .
• Succ(S ) = {s ∈ S | ∃s ∈ S . s → s}, and
• Pred(S ) = {s ∈ S | ∃s ∈ S . s → s }, that map a set S of states to the states reachable from some state in S and from which some state in S is reachable, respectively, then the set FR of forward-reachable states and the set BR of backward reachable states are obtained by the following fixed point computations (the index identifies the round of the fixpoint iteration):
In our implementation, the reachability fixed points are computed using a table that maps each location of M N to a clock federation. Two locations m 1 and m 2 of M are equivalent if the clock federations for (m 1 , n) and (m 2 , n) are the same for all locations n of N . The equivalence is thus computed as follows. For each location n of N we first identify the set of pairs of M-locations and clock federations that n occurs with; we call this set the occurrence pattern of n. Then, we group the locations of N according to their occurrence pattern. The cost of the computation is thus linear in the number of locations of M and N and constant or logarithmic in the number of equivalence classes, depending on the data structure used to represent the equivalence classes. In practice, the complexity is dominated by the cost of computing the reachibility fixed point, which is exponential in the number of clocks [3] .
A certificate based on both the forward and the backward equivalence can be obtained by computing the two equivalences in sequence, for example by first computing a forward and then a backward quotient:
Forward-Backward Reachability
The forward and backward equivalences introduced in the previous section base the equivalence either on forward reachability or on backward reachability, but not on both directions at the same time. This results in unnecessarily large quotients, as the following example illustrates. Figure 8 shows the network M N . Locations b and c of the timed automaton M can safely be merged, because the final location remains unreachable in the network. However, b and c are not forward-equivalent, because they are forward-reachable at different times: location b is reached for x > 3, location c for x > 4 (both in conjunction with location f of N ). Since their backward reachability differs also (x < 1 for b and x < 2 for c), they are not backward-equivalent either.
In this section, we define a coarser equivalence that takes both forward and backward reachability into account. For a timed automaton A with finite semantics sem(A) = (S, I, Σ, ∆, χ, F ), we denote the forward-backward reachable states, that is, the states of sem(A) that are reachable from an initial state, and from which a final state is reachable, with fbr(A) ⊆ S (s ∈ fbr(A) ⇔ ∃i ∈ I. i −→ * s ∧ ∃f ∈ F. s −→ * f ).
Note that it is not sound to simply restrict the definitions of forward and backward equivalence to the forward-backward reachable states in M N . Consider a modification of the example from Figure 8 , where the guard on the transition from location a to location b is changed to x > 1. The subsets of the forward-reachable states in b and c that are also backward reachable are both still empty. However, merging b and c is no longer safe, because the quotient would, for example, include the path to the final location that passes the merged location {b, c} at time 1.5. In the following definition we therefore pose a slightly stronger requirement, by considering the forwardbackward reachable states of N in isolation, rather than in the combination M N .
We first compute the finite semantics of N alone, resulting in the set fbr(N ) of forward-backward reachable states. We then generalize this set to the states of M N , by adding the clocks of M: let fbr(N ) M N denote the set of regions over the clocks of M N , such that a region is in fbr(N ) M N iff its projection on the clocks of N is in fbr(N ).
Let L M be the locations of M, and let
We call two locations m 1 , m 2 ∈ L M weakly forward-equivalent if m 1 ∼ F m 2 and weakly backwardequivalent if m 1 ∼ B m 2 . Compared to the forward and backward equivalence defined in the previous section, the requirements have been weakened in the sense that we ignore global states whose N part is incompatible with N alone. Ignoring these states is safe: A simple corollary of the theorem is that every equivalence relation ∼ that is finer than ∼ F or ∼ B can be used to obtain a certificate. 
Approximating Reachability
Since the cost of computing the forward and backward reachable states grows exponentially with the number of clocks, it is often too expensive to compute these sets precisely. In this section, we propose an approximative technique that over-and underapproximates these sets based on an over-and underapproximation of the successor operator. Constructing the approximations is cheap, but results in certificates, because the resulting equivalence relation is finer than the corresponding (weak) forward or backward equivalence.
In Section 7, we show that the approximation can be stepwise refined, converging to the precise forward and backward reachable sets. The refinement steps are inexpensive, and intermediate results can be used to build intermediate certificates.
The approximative reachability analysis is based on an abstraction structure, which we define to be any partition Π of the states S of the finite semantics sem(M N ) = (S, I, Σ, χ, ∆, F ) of M N . Intuitively, the state sets in Π constitute blocks in the state space that are either added completely or not at all by the approximative Succ and Pred operators. We obtain two versions of each operator: Succ(P ) computes the union of all state sets P ∈ Π of the partition Π such that some state in P has a predecessor in P ; Succ(P ) computes the union of all state sets P in Π such that all states in P have a predecessor in P . Pred and Pred are defined analogously:
Replacing the precise Succ and Pred operators in the fixed point construction from Section 4, we obtain four state sets: an overapproximation FR and an underapproximation FR of the forward reachable states, and, likewise, an overapproximation BR and an underapproximation BR of the backward reachable states.
Our implementation again computes the four approximated reachability fixed points using a table that maps each location of M N to a clock federation.We can establish the forward/backward equivalence of two locations m 1 and m 2 of M once the entries for the over-and underapproximation coincide for the entries for (m 1 , n) and (m 2 , n) for all locations n of N by the same technique as in the precise method described in Section 4. Likewise, we can exclude the forward/backward equivalence of two locations m 1 and m 2 as soon as, for some location n of N , the underapproximation of the set of regions attached to (m 1 , n) is not a subset of the overapproximation of the regions attached to (m 2 , n). We can approximate weak forward and weak backward equivalence by intersecting with fbr(N ) M N as described in Section 5.
Abstraction Refinement
Finer abstraction structures result in coarser equivalence relations and, hence, smaller quotients. We iteratively construct a sequence of successively coarser equivalences by stepwise refining the partition Π i . This results in an ascending chain
of underapproximations and a descending chain
of overapproximations (the superscript indicates the iteration round). Both chains converge to FR when Π i converges to the set of singleton sets. We start with some initial partition Π 0 that separates the final states from all other states. In our implementation, Π 0 partitions the states according to their locations. In every iteration of the refinement loop, we split Π i with a setP ⊆ S of states, resulting in the new partition
The setP is chosen by the refinement strategy, which we discuss in the next section. In each new iteration, some results of the previous iteration can be reused. For example, the inclusion
Note that this guarantees that no element of any partition is added twice to the underapproximation. Likewise, the inclusion
An iterative computation of the backward-reachable states can be defined analogously.
After every iteration, the approximation defines an equivalence ≈, which can be used to compute an intermediate certificate C . While ≈ is finer than the precise forward or backward equivalences, it often reduces M significantly already after a few refinement steps. In that case, we can replace M with C , and, if desired, switch between computing the forward and backward equivalence. A reuse of intermediate results is still possible after replacing M with C : we again start with
Refinement Strategies
The abstraction refinement loop described in the previous section requires a refinement strategy that selects the split setP . A simple breadth-first strategy is to chooseP = Succ(FR i ) and P = Pred(BR i ) to improve the approximation of the forward and backward reachable states, respectively.
In this section, we describe a more complex path-based refinement strategy that attempts to focus the refinement process towards locations that can quickly be shown to be equivalent. We present the strategy for the forward equivalence. There is an analogous strategy for the backward equivalence. The strategy is based on the observation that, in order to determine that a location m is equivalent to some other location, all states associated with m in the overapproximation must also be present in the underapproximation. The strategy heuristically picks some m where this is not the case and then refines the abstraction along the abstract paths that lead to states in FR FR associated with m.
A (minimal) abstract path of some state s is a (shortest) sequence a 0 , a 1 , . . . a k ∈ (Σ ∪ R ≥0 ) * of transitions such that there exists a corresponding sequence of state sets P 0 , P 1 , . . . P k ∈ I · Π * where s ∈ P k and, for all i, 0 ≤ i < k, there is an s i ∈ P i and an s i+1 ∈ P i+1 such that s i a i − → s i+1 . In order to refine the abstraction with respect to a particular abstract path, the abstraction is split with the state sets that are reachable along the path, i.e., with the state sets from the sequence P 0 , P 1 , . . . P k ∈ (2 S ) * where P 0 = I, and, for all i, 0 ≤ i < k, P i+1 = {s ∈ S | ∃s ∈ P i . s
The efficiency of this strategy depends on the choice of the location m. The heuristic used in our implementation is to minimize the length of the abstract paths. We compute, for each location m of M, the length of the longest minimal abstract path to some state associated with m. The location with the least such length is chosen for refinement. Table 1 shows experimental results with our prototype implementation on four case studies provided by our industrial partners BPS IT-Solutions and META-LEVEL Software AG (CP 3-8, GPS1 2-10, GPS2 2-10, and WR 2-3). For each benchmark, the table shows the size of the environment automaton and the component automaton (given as the number of locations), the size of the certificate, the running time of the certificate synthesis, the performance of the Uppaal [20] model checker on M N and C N , and the break-even point of certificate synthesis, i.e., the number of model checking runs after which it is cheaper to first synthesize the certificate instead of directly model checking the full system. Combination Platform (CP). The combination platform benchmark, provided by META-LEVEL Software AG, models a platform used in car manufacturing that combines several testing machines with units for cleaning and polishing. The different units work in parallel and synchronize after completing their tasks. The critical property of the combination platform is that the work is completed by a certain deadline. The benchmark is parameterized in the number of sub-controllers included in the model.
Benchmarks and Results
Gear Production Stack (GPS1). The gear production stack benchmark, provided by BPS ITSolutions, models a production machine for gear wheels, which consists of units for casting, hardening, and polishing. The units work sequentially on a single workpiece. Like in the CP benchmark, the property requires that the work is completed by a certain deadline. The benchmark is again parameterized in the number of sub-controllers included in the model.
Gear Production Stack (GPS2). This is a variation of the GPS1 benchmark with a simpler property that sets a deadline for a single sub-controller rather than the full system. Table 1 . Certificate synthesis for the Combination Platform (CP), the Gear Production Stack (GPS1, GPS2), and the Workpiece Router (WR). The table shows the size of the environment automaton (N ), the size of the component automaton (M), the size of the certificate (C), the running time of the certificate construction using the backward path-based refinement heuristics, the performance of Uppaal on M N and C N , and the break-even point of certificate synthesis. The size of the timed automata is given as the number of locations, the Uppaal performance is given as the number of states explored and the running time. All benchmarks were measured on an AMD Opteron processor with 2.6 GHz.
code reader and classified into one of several types. Depending on the type, the workpiece is routed to a specific processing station. After a processing station finishes, the workpiece leaves the routing plant. We consider a subset of the types as "critical". Table 2 . Incremental computation of the forward and backward equivalences using the breadthfirst (BF) and path-based (PB) refinement strategies. The table shows the size of the certificate (C) and the running times for the computation of the forward and backward equivalences for the Combination Platform (CP), the Gear Production Stack (GPS1, GPS2), and the Workpiece Router (WR).
that all workpieces that belong to such a critical type are processed on time. The benchmark is parametrized in the number of critical types. For each critical type, the benchmark additionally contains two non-critical types.
Our implementation approximates the weak equivalence relations defined in Section 5 based on a cheap approximation of the set fbr(N ) that partitions the states according to their locations.
Comparing the growth of the component M with the growth of the certificate C in our parameterized benchmarks, it is evident that the certificate grows much slower. The difference is most clear-cut in the GPS benchmarks, where the size of M grows exponentially, while the size of C only grows linearly. In this example, some discrete transitions in the sub-controllers occur independently of each other and therefore cause an exponential blow-up in the size of M. Since these transitions are irrelevant for the processing time of the workpiece, the corresponding locations are merged in the certificate. Reflecting the sequential composition of the processing steps, the size of the certificate grows linearly. Figure 9 illustrates the incremental certificate synthesis from Section 7 using data from the Workpiece Router benchmark. Our implementation starts with an initial abstraction that partitions the states according to their location and then applies either the breadth-first refinement strategy or the path-based refinement strategy. While both strategies lead to an early decrease in the size of the certificate, the path-based strategy clearly performs better. This is analyzed in detail in Table 2 , which shows experimental data from the incremental computation of the forward and backward equivalences with the two strategies: path-based refinement outperforms breadth-first refinement in all benchmarks. 
Conclusions
We have presented a solution to the problem of synthesizing a certificate for a timed automaton M in a network M N . In contrast to the NP hardness of finding the minimal certificate, the cost of our construction is just linear in the number of locations; nevertheless, the dramatic decrease in size from the component M to the certificate C in our experimental results suggests that the certificates found by our construction are close to minimal.
Since our approach is based on a reachability construction, the worst-case complexity in terms of the number of clocks is exponential. To address this issue we have proposed an iterative approximation method that can be interrupted at any time to produce a sound certificate.
We believe that the certificates constructed by certifying model checkers will be useful to designers in understanding which component requirements are hard in the sense that they are necessary to guarantee the safety of the system, and which requirements are soft, that is, relevant for the quality provided by the system but not for its safety. Such a classification is an important piece of documentation and useful in future adaptations of the verified design.
An interesting open question is whether it is possible to fine-tune the performance of the certificate synthesis algorithm so that the time invested in the generation of the certificate already amortizes in the first model checking run. In this way, certifying model checking would not only be more informative than standard model checking, but also faster.
In our experiments, certificate synthesis is more expensive than verification. However, the fact that the size of the certificate already drops significantly after a few refinement steps suggests that a better trade-off between synthesis and verification may be found by interrupting the synthesis process early.
